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ABSTRACT
Since Slovakia's transition from authoritarian rule to democracy and the 
rule of law in 1992, the Slovak people are empowered to participate in the 
decision-making of the state by means of the popular initiative and the 
referendum. Although seven referendums have been held in the Slovak 
Republic  so  far,  only  one  was  considered  valid.  This  paper  aims  to 
illustrate the reasons for this scarce success of popular votes and gives a 
brief  insight  into  the  significance  of  direct  democracy  in  the  Slovak 
Republic.  To  this  purpose,  it  will  set  out  the  instruments  of  direct 
democracy provided in Slovakia and the experiences made therewith.
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Introduction
Since  gaining  independence  from Czechoslovakia  on  January  1,  1993, 
seven referendums have been held in the Slovak Republic, six of which 
were  declared  invalid  due  to  not  reaching  the  prescribed  participation 
threshold  of  50% of  the  electorate.  The  most  recent  example  is  the 
referendum of September 18, 2010 which was declared invalid with all its 
six proposals. 
The  new  democratic  constitution  of  September  1,  1992  (Slovakian 
Constitution1, CS) puts the people in the position of the legislature and 
offers them the possibility to initiate referendum proceedings by launching 
a popular initiative. Despite the new democratic rights which the Slovak 
population enjoys since the transformation from authoritarian rule, there 
seems to be no real will to make use of these rights to participate in the 
decision-making process  of  their  state,  despite  the fact  that  the  voter 
turnout in Slovakian elections is normally rather high. 
This paper gives an overview of the popular votes held since Slovakia’s 
independence,  namely  by  presenting  the  subject  matter,  the  political 
context and the results of the referendums. It concludes with an attempt 
to explain the deficiencies of the direct democratic system in the Slovak 
Republic. 
1 Instruments of direct democracy in the Slovak Republic
Chapter five of the Slovak CS splits the legislative power into Section one 
on the national council  of  the Slovak Republic (article 72seq.) and the 
referendum  in  Part  two  (article  93seq.).  The  latter  implies  the 
incorporation of the people in the legislative power of the state by means 
of popular vote. Article 100 of the CS refers to the Referendum Law of 
19922, which contains detailed regulations on the holding of referendums. 
The following participatory rights of the Slovak people are provided by the 
constitution:
1.1 Mandatory referendum
Pursuant to article 93 par. 1 and article 7 par. 1 CS, it is mandatory to 
hold a referendum on a constitutional law on the accession of Slovakia to 
a union with other states or the secession from such. When this provision 
was  incorporated  into  the  1992  CS,  its  purpose  was  to  regulate  the 
relations  with  regard  to  Czechoslovakia.  However,  the  mandatory 
referendum was never applied as the separation from Slovakia and the 
1 Constitution of the Slovak Republic of September 1, 1992, Collection of Laws no. 
460/1992).
2 Referendum Law of November 19, 1992, Collection of Laws no. 564/1992.
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Czech Republic became effective on January 1, 1993 as a result of political 
agreements (Belko/Kopeček, 2003:194). 
1.2 Recall of the president
By Constitution Law No. 9 adopted on January 14, 19993 the National 
Council introduced the direct election of the presidency and a popular vote 
on  the  recall  of  the  president.  After  an  attempt  to  establish  direct 
presidential elections failed to reach the necessary turnout in the popular 
vote held on May 24, 1997, Constitutional Law No. 9 established the new 
ruling in article 101 par. 2 CS. The said law also amended par. 2 of article 
106 CS in as much as an accordant resolution of the national council on 
the recall of the president further requires the approval of the majority of 
all  citizens  entitled  to  vote  (par.  2)  (Bárány/Brhlíková/Colotka, 
2001:173seq.).  So  far  there  has  not  been  an  attempt  to  recall  the 
president of Slovakia. 
1.3 Optional referendum
The legal foundation for optional referendums can be found in article 93 
par.  2 CS,  which limits  the  subjects  of  the  referendums to  'important 
issues of public interest'. However there is no accredited definition of what 
this constraint exactly entails (Bárány/Brhlíková/Colotka, 2001:172). By 
excluding  issues of  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms,  taxes,  duties  or 
issues on state budget, article 93 par. 3 CS further restricts the scope of 
possible topics that can be put to a popular vote. In accordance with its 
systematic placement in the Constitution, an optional referendum can be 
targeted  for  a  legislative  change  and,  as  to  a  decision  of  the  Slovak 
Constitutional Court, on constitutional issues as well.4
a. Popular initiative
As to article  95 par.  1 CS, the president will  declare the holding of  a 
referendum  on  a  petition  submitted  and  signed  by  at  least  350,000 
citizens.  As  will  be  seen  further  on,  the  popular  initiative  became  a 
standard tool for the political opposition to achieve the submittal of their 
proposals to a popular vote against the will of the ruling majority (Möckli, 
1996:24seq.).
3 Constitutional Law No. 9 of January 14, 1999, Collection of Laws no. 9/1999. 
4 Constitutional Court judgment of May 21, 1997, published in File Ref. II, US 
31/97 of the Slovak collection of laws.
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b. Resolution of the national council to hold a referendum
Pursuant  to  article  95  par.  1  CS,  a  resolution  passed  by the  national 
council  can  trigger  proceedings of  a  referendum as  well.  According  to 
article  96  par.  1  CS,  this  resolution  can  be  initiated  by  means  of  a 
proposal submitted by a member of parliament or by a citizen petition as 
per article 27 CS.
c. Common rules with regard to the optional referendum
In cases of doubt about the constitutionality of a popular initiative or a 
resolution, article 95 par. 2 CS allows the president to submit the proposal 
to  the  constitutional  court  before  declaring  the  holding  of  a  national 
referendum. This optional content related assessment of the submittals 
aims  at  ensuring  the  safeguarding  of  the  constitutional  order  and 
constitutes  an  important  control  mechanism  in  transitional  countries. 
However, according to article 95 par. 1 and 2 CS the referendum has to 
be held within 120 days after the receipt of an initiative or a resolution. 
Article  98  par.  1  CS  predicates  the  validity  of  a  referendum  on  the 
participation  of  the  absolute  majority  of  the  eligible  voters  and  its 
approval  by a majority of  the valid  votes cast.  As will  be shown, this 
threshold distorted the results of the votes held so far and presents the 
main hurdle for the functioning of direct democracy in Slovakia. Finally, as 
to par. 2, the national council promulgates the results adopted by a valid 
referendum as law. This provision is very ambiguous, as it does not imply 
that the results of the votes are legally binding, but merely the procedural 
aspects of the referendum results (Láštic, 2007:190).
Another  ambiguity  exists  with  regard  to  the  legal  impacts  of  the 
referendum results. Hence, article 99 par. 1 CS provides that the results 
can  be  amended  or  repealed  by  a  constitutional  law  passed  by  the 
national  council  after  a  period  of  three  years.  Additionally,  the 
Constitutional  Court  has determined in the judgment mentioned before 
that  referendum  results  do  not  have  a  binding  effect  with  regard  to 
constitutional amendments.5 
2 Direct democracy in practice
Seven popular votes have been held so far in the Slovak Republic, six of 
which were declared invalid as less than half of the electorate participated 
in the voting. 
5 More hereto below in 2.1.b. 
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2.1 Referendums held during the 1990s
a. Referendum of October 22, 1994 on the retrospective disclosure of 
financial transactions regarding privatization 
After the very first  attempt by Vladimir  Mečiar,  leader of  the majority 
People’s Party Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), to trigger a 
referendum failed in early 1994, the National Council passed a resolution 
in July 1994 on the holding of a referendum based on an initiative brought 
about  by  the  opposition,  the  Union  of  Slovak  Workers  (ZSR).  As  the 
subject  matter  concerned  the  delicate  issue  of  privatization,  the 
referendum  was  accompanied  by  intense  political  controversies.  The 
National Council solved the issue by passing a law on exactly the same 
subject matter even before the referendum was held. Aware of the fact 
that the result of the referendum scheduled for October 22, 1994 would 
not  have  any  further  impact,  many  voters  did  not  participate  at  all. 
Consequently, the vote had to be declared invalid by the Central Election 
Commission, as the turnout reached only 19.97%, instead of the required 
50%  threshold6 (Láštic,  2007:191).  By  campaigning  for  the  initiative 
proposal,  however,  the  ZRS  were  successful,  in  that  they  gained  the 
public’s attention and thus successfully moved into the National Council on 
the occasion of the 1994 elections (Belko/Kopeček, 2003:3seq.).
b. Referendum of May 24, 1997 on the direct election of the president 
and three submittals regarding the NATO accession
In order to  prevent the governing HZDS and its  coalition under Prime 
Minister Mečiar from taking power once the incumbent President Kováč’s 
term of office had expired, the opposition submitted a proposal to the 
National Council for the adoption of a resolution to call a referendum on 
the introduction of direct presidential elections. After the ruling coalition 
opposed the proposal, the opposition –  aware of the significance of the 
topic  and  aiming  at  increasing  their  political  support  by  the  people  –
succeeded  in  launching  a  popular  initiative  by  submitting  521,000 
signatures, (Láštic, 2007:192seq.). 
In  order  to  avert  the  public’s  attention  from the  opposition’s  initiative 
proposal, the governing majority in the National Council  then passed a 
resolution on the calling of a referendum. With Slovakia’s NATO accession 
as subject matter, the coalition was aware of the potentially controversial 
nature of the topic and the public attention it would attract. Although the 
political attitude of the governing HZDS has always been against NATO 
membership, the coalition now assumed a supportive position for tactical 
reasons  (Belko/Kopeček,  2003:4seq.).  The  ballot  question  of  a  NATO 
accession was supplemented by two other, rather secondary questions on 
6 Detailed results: http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=13110
3 (last accessed 6.9.2012).
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the deployment of nuclear weapons and the deployment of military bases 
on Slovak territory. Consequently, President Kováč decided to submit all 
four  questions  to  the  referendum  in  order  to  reach  higher  voter 
participation and therefore the validity of the referendum. To combat the 
opposition’s proposal, the governing coalition filed a complaint with the 
Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the initiative. With its ruling 
of  May 21,  1997,  the  court  established that  the  subject  matter  of  an 
initiative according to article 93 par. 1 CS can indeed be of a constitutional 
nature, but that the referendum results in such cases are to be considered 
as mere 'recommendations' to the parliament to amend the constitution, 
rather than being legally binding.7 Furthermore it ruled that the initiative 
proposal was incomplete, as it did not contain the necessary explanatory 
brochure  prescribed  by  article  2  par.  3  of  the  Referendum Law.  This 
judgment  caused  confusion,  which  was  exploited  by  the  governing 
coalition. Consequently,  the Ministry of the Interior printed ballot slips, 
which did not contain the ballot question with regard to the direct election 
of  the  president  (Belko/Kopeček,  2003:5).  The  opposition  parties  then 
called on their voters to boycott the referendum scheduled for May 24, 
1997.  As  a  result,  this  referendum had  to  be  declared  invalid  by  the 
Central Electoral Commission, not for the reason that only 9.8% of the 
electorate cast their votes, but because the vote did not comply with the 
rules, since the ballot papers only contained three, instead of the four 
questions as promulgated by the President.8 
After several political confrontations, the Constitutional Court ruled that by 
leaving out the fourth ballot question, the Ministry of the Interior violated 
the  constitutional  rights  of  the  citizens.9 Thereupon  President  Kováč 
promised to repeat the referendum in April 1998. But already in March 
1998, his presidential term expired and as the Parliament was unable to 
form  a  majority  to  appoint  a  new  president,  Prime  Minister  Mečiar 
assumed  a  number  of  important  presidential  powers.  He  revoked  the 
repetition of the referendum and pardoned everyone involved in the 1997 
referendum. As  a  result,  the  political  confrontation  and  polarization  in 
Slovakia was intensified (Láštic, 2007:194).
c. Referendum  of  September  26,  1998  on  the  prohibition  of  the 
privatization of strategically important enterprises
The referendum held in 1998 had a smaller impact and was politically less 
contentious (Belko/Kopeček, 2003:6). In order to increase voter support 
again, the ruling coalition under Mečiar’s HZDS submitted an initiative for 
the  holding  of  a  referendum on  the  prohibition  of  the  privatization  of 
strategically  important  enterprises.  Although  the  vote  was  scheduled 
7 Cf. FN 3.
8 Results on: http://www.c2d.ch/votes.php?
level=1&country=257&=0&=0&yearr=specificyears&speyear%5B
%5D=1997&result=0&terms=&table=votes&sub=Submit_Query  (last accessed 
06.09.2012).
9 Unpublished ruling of the Constitutional Court of 09.01.1998.
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contemporaneously with the parliamentary elections, it failed again due to 
a  low  voter  turnout  of  only  44%,  while  the  turnout  for  the  elections 
amounted to 84.22%.10 Not only with regard to the referendum but also 
with regard to the election outcome, the coalition had to accept a defeat 
and from then on assumed the position of the opposition. Shortly after, 
the HZDS and the Slovak National Party (SNS) launched an initiative for a 
new  attempt  of  their  proposal  and  succeeded  in  gathering  enough 
signatures.  Besides  the  prohibition  of  the  privatization  of  strategic 
enterprises, the petition contained a proposal to make it impossible for a 
minority language to become an official language. However, a referendum 
was  not  called,  as  in  August  1999  the  then  newly  elected  President 
Schuster  concluded that  the  proposals  were  unconstitutional,  firstly  by 
violating article 99 par. 2 CS, which contains a moratorium of three years 
for  resubmitting  the  same  question  to  popular  vote,  and  secondly  by 
violating  article  93  par.  3  CS,  which  excludes  issues  related  to 
fundamental  rights  and  freedoms  from being  decided  by  popular  vote 
(Láštic, 2007:194).
2.2 Referendum of November 11, 2000 on the holding of early general 
elections
By collecting 700,000 signatures, the opposition parties HZDS and SNS, 
who blamed the governing coalition for the disastrous economic and social 
conditions in Slovakia, launched a popular initiative on the amendment of 
the electoral law in order to hold early general elections.  Once again, the 
subject matter gave rise to political struggles and controversies, and the 
governing coalition called on the voters to boycott the referendum once 
more. Hence, it is not surprising that on November 11, 2000 only 19.98% 
of the electorate participated and the vote had to be declared invalid yet 
again.11
2.3 Referendum  of  May  17,  2003  on  Slovakia’s  accession  to  the 
European Union
The resolution passed by the National Council on January 21, 2003, which 
called for a referendum on the accession of Slovakia to the EU, was the 
very first – and as it turns out – the only resolution passed in accordance 
with article 95 par. 1 CS and with the agreement of the main political 
parties  of  Slovakia  (Láštic,  2007:194).  Even  the  Eurosceptic  HZDS 
10 Results on: http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=37786 
(last accessed 06.09.2012). 
11 Result on: http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=38527 
(last accessed 06.09.2012).
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abstained  from  launching  a  counter-campaign.  This  unanimity  can  be 
explained with the relation of Slovakia to the EU before the accession, or 
more  precisely,  with  Slovakia’s  exclusion  from the  integration process, 
due to the Mečiar government during the 1990s. The fact that the EU 
criticized Slovakia for not having accomplished any democratic progress 
as the only post-communist country, sidelined the state with regard to its 
foreign relations and impeded economic progress. Hence the EU accession 
became a question of vital  interest for Slovakia (Belko/Kopeček, 2003: 
5).12 
a. Legal foundation of the referendum
The referendum scheduled for May 16 and 17, was not mandatory as it 
was not held pursuant to article 93 par. 1 CS in combination with article 7 
par. 1 CS. As mentioned before, these provisions were enacted merely to 
be applied with regard to the relations of former Czechoslovakia and could 
therefore not serve as a legal basis for the calling of a popular vote on the 
accession to the EU (Albi, 2005:68). Rather, the National Council made 
use of its competence provided by article 7 par. 3 CS and 413, according to 
which it is empowered to approve an international treaty on the transfer 
of parts of Slovakia’s powers to the European Union. Hence the National 
Council  was  not  obliged  by  law  to  obtain  the  approval  of  the  Slovak 
people. Nevertheless, on January 21, 2003 it submitted a resolution to the 
President  to  call  a  referendum  on  a  'crucial  issue  of  public  interest' 
according to article 93 par. 2 and article 95 par. 1 CS. 
b. Results and explanation 
Finally, on May 16 and 17, 52.12% of Slovak voters participated in the 
referendum and an overwhelming 93.71% approved of the EU accession.14 
Although  this  was  the  very  first  referendum  to  be  valid  due  to  the 
achieved turnout of  50%, it  is  remarkable that the threshold was just 
barely passed, despite the general interest of the Slovak people to join the 
EU.
This  lack  of  interest  and  the  consequent  abstention  can  be  explained 
firstly with the generally low will of the Slovak people to participate in the 
decision-making of the state by means of a referendum.15 Furthermore the 
mentioned unanimity of the political parties raised the general expectation 
12 See also Láštic, 191seq.; Henderson, 653seq.
13 Introduced by Constitutional Law No. 90 of February 23, 2001 in order to 
prepare the country for a membership in the EU and NATO. More hereto in 
Malová Darina/Láštic Erik, 'The Gradual Amending of the Slovak Constitution: 
Combating the Ambiguous Rules in 1992-2001', Central European Political 
Science Review, Vol. 2, 4/2001, 103-128.
14 Result on http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=39083 
(last accessed 06.09.2012).
15 More hereto below in 3.3.
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that the National Council  would in any case ratify the accession treaty, 
based on article  4 par.  2 and 4 CS, regardless of  whether the people 
would  reject  an  accession  by  popular  vote,  or  if  the  vote  would  be 
declared  invalid  due  to  a  low  participation.  Also  the  extent  of  the 
campaigning is known to play a role with regard to the turnout results. 
While dominating the 2002 election campaign, accession to the EU was 
based on a cross-party approval, with no counter-campaign launched at 
all. This absolute lack of disagreement between the political elites during 
the entire process preliminary to the vote and the – at the same time – 
rather modest amount of campaigning in favor of the accession resolution 
thwarted  the  mobilization  of  both  proponents  and  opponents  of  the 
accession to cast their votes.16 Finally, by abstaining from voting, people 
could express their dissatisfaction with the government and their current 
situation (Belko/Kopeček, 2003:6seq.). 
2.4 Referendum of April 3, 2004 on the holding of general elections
Due  to  dissatisfaction  with  the  ruling  center-right  coalition,  the  Trade 
Union Confederation (KOZ) and the oppositional Social Democratic Party 
(Smer)  collected  over  half  a  million  signatures  in  order  to  call  a 
referendum on the holding of early parliamentary elections. In order to 
ensure  sufficient  voter  participation,  the  President  scheduled  the 
referendum on the  same day as  the  presidential  elections.  As  he was 
opposed to the government and the ruling coalition, his tactical approach 
caused intense political  struggles and led the governing parties to ask 
their voters to boycott the referendum (Láštic, 2007:195). Consequently, 
also the referendum of April 3 had to be declared invalid by the Electoral 
Commission,  as  the  turnout  amounted  to  only  35.86%,  while  87.91% 
voted in favor of the proposal.17
2.5 Referendum of September 18, 2010 on the reform package
On February 17,  2010 the liberal  Freedom and Solidarity  party  (SaS), 
which was not represented in the National  Council,  submitted 398,089 
signatures in order to launch a popular initiative. The initiative contained 
six different proposals targeting a restriction of the excessive privileges of 
political elites. Due to frequent accusations of corruption and exploitation 
by these, the SaS was well aware of the public attention that could be 
attracted by this issue and of the opportunity to raise its own profile.18 
16 More details hereto in: Henderson, 655seq., 662seq.
17 Results on: http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?
lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=38941 
(last accessed 06.09.2012).
18 See hereto: 'Slovakia’s voters: Whatever', The Economist online from 
20.9.2010: http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2010/09/ 
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Accordingly, the six initiative proposals were the following: 1. Abolition of 
concession fees for broadcasting and television, 2. Curbing parliamentary 
immunity  from  criminal  prosecution,  3.  Reduction  of  the  number  of 
parliamentary seats, 4. Price ceiling for official vehicles driven by office 
holders, 5. Introduction of Internet elections, and 6. Abolition of the right 
of reply for office holders.
As  a  matter  of  fact,  by  including  these  proposals  into  its  election 
campaign, the SaS succeeded in crossing the 5% threshold necessary to 
enter parliament in the elections held on June 12, 2010 and itself became 
part of the ruling center-right coalition.19 Four of the six proposals, i.e. the 
curbing of parliamentary immunity, the canceling of TV and radio license 
fees, the introduction of Internet voting and the abolition of the right of 
reply, were thereupon included in the political program of the coalition. 
Nevertheless,  the  initiative  proposals  caused  political  contention  once 
again, and were condemned as  'political advertising of a single party'.20 
Consequently, some leaders of the ruling coalition announced that they 
would not participate in the vote scheduled for September 18, 2010 and 
the opposition called their voters to boycott the referendum.21
The outcome of the referendum scheduled for September 18, 2010 merely 
confirmed the experiences made with the popular votes held until then in 
Slovakia: While the proposals reached an overwhelming support varying 
between 76.02% and 98.21%, only 22.84% of  the 4.3  million  eligible 
voters participated – thus far short of the required 50%.22
2.6 Conclusions
To sum up,  the referendums held in Slovakia so far  seem to follow a 
consistent pattern. Accordingly, they have always been triggered by the 
political  opposition  parties  or  by  parties  aiming  at  attracting  public 
attention in order to increase voter support and electoral success. Nothing 
else can be said with regard to the EU accession vote, where even parties 
like the HZDS and the SNS, which are mainly in the opposition, abstained 
from launching anti-accession campaigns. Linked with this aim to raise the 
party profile, the proposals submitted to popular vote generally implied 
politically  controversial  issues  and  thus  entailed  that  the  processes 
preliminary  to  the  referendums  were  characterized  by  heavy  political 
slovakias_referendum (last accessed 06.09.2012).
19 Information based on the Report of the Slovak Spectator of 29.6.2010, online 
on: http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/39405/10/slovak_president_gasparovic
_will_announce_a_sas_initiated_referendum.html (last accessed 06.09.2012).
20 The Economist online from 20.9.2010.
21 The Slovak Spectator of 17.7.2010, available online on: 
http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/39559/2/sas_accuses_president_of_sabota
ging_referendum.html (last accessed 06.09.2012).
22 All results accessible in the country profile of Slovakia on: 
http://www.c2d.ch/votes.php?table=votes. 
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struggles. Hence, it is not surprising that this uniform image of Slovakian 
referendums also encompasses a general  indifference to voting on the 
part of the Slovak people. 
3 Explanation  of  the  low  voter  turnout  in  Slovakia’s 
referendums
An online blog on The Economist website considered the failure of  the 
most recent 2010 referendum in connection with the revocation of six of 
the seven referendums held so far in Slovakia as a 'referendum apathy of 
the Slovak people'23.  This  apathy can be explained by several  factors, 
some of which are summarized below.
3.1 Institutional factors
One of  the central  institutional  problems of  the Slovak Republic  is  the 
general lack of clarity in the 1992 Constitution, which allows political elites 
and  statesmen  to  interpret  the  regulations  to  their  own  benefit 
(Bárány/Brhlíková/Colotka,  2001:172).  In particular,  this  relates  to the 
relation between representative and direct democracy. As to article 2 par. 
1  CS  'the  state  power  derives  from  the  citizens',  who  exercise  their 
political  rights  directly  or  through  their  elected  representatives. 
Accordingly,  Chapter  5  of  the  Constitution,  regulating  the  legislative 
power,  dedicates  the  second  section  to  the  referendum  as  means  of 
participation  in  the  decision-making  process  of  the  state.  In  the  first 
section  however  –  or  more  precisely  in  article  72  –  the  Constitution 
prescribes the national council to be the 'sole constitutional and legislative 
body of the Slovak Republic' and article 86 lit. a, allocates the power to 
decide upon the constitution, constitutional  laws and other laws to the 
parliament.  This  raises  the  assumption  of  the  supremacy  of  the 
representative system and of the non-binding effect of popular decisions. 
This assumption is confirmed by article 99 par. 1 CS, according to which 
results of a referendum are binding for three years, but can be amended 
or  revoked  by  constitutional  law  by  the  national  council  thereafter.24 
Furthermore the Constitutional  Court’s  ruling of  May 21,  1997 clarified 
that  referendums  implying  constitutional  amendments  are  to  be 
considered as mere recommendations to the national council, which has 
the final say based on article 72 and article 86 lit. a CS.
23 The Economist online from 20.9.2010.
24 Another way of interpretation is that this article provides the referendum 
outcome with a supra-legal effect, as it can only be changed or revoked by the 
passing of a constitutional law, see: Láštic, 190.
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Moreover, the high number of required signatures (350,000) as stipulated 
by article 95 par. 1 CS, constitutes a hurdle for the people to launch an 
initiative and to trigger a referendum against the will of the parliamentary 
majority.
Another  institutional  problem is  the  validity  threshold  for  referendums 
prescribed by article 99 par. 1 CS, as it enables opponents to scupper a 
referendum  proposal  by  simply  not  participating  in  the  ballot.  These 
abstentions, however, are means to distort the referendum results and, as 
experiences in Slovakia have shown, the political  parties opposed to a 
proposal  have,  for  this  reason,  made  frequent  use  of  calling  on  their 
voters to boycott a referendum.
3.2 Political factors
Ever since its transition from socialist rule to the rule of law on January 1, 
1993, Slovakia’s political  landscape has been characterized by a strong 
political  polarization  between  a  liberal  urban  and  a  conservative  rural 
electorate,  still  tolerant  towards the former conditions.25 These leading 
parties,  which  alternate  in  taking  governmental  power,  follow 
fundamentally different political objectives.
As the experiences showed, the actual functioning of instruments of direct 
democracy, introduced to enable the people to participate in the decision-
making of the state, has been hindered in Slovakia by political parties, 
which  use  these  for  their  own profiling.  By  choosing  topics  of  a  high 
populist  significance,  parties  aim  at  catching  the  people’s  interest,  in 
particular  by  launching  the  campaigning  before  the  scheduled  general 
elections. Thus, it seems that the primary aim of referendum campaigns 
has always been to gain voter support in order to be elected to or to gain 
more  seats  in  the  National  Council  (Henderson,  2004:658).  Also,  with 
regard  to  the  accession  of  Slovakia  to  the  EU,  the  tactical  political 
approach  became  obvious,  when  in  order  to  not  gamble  away  voter 
support,  even the parties that were originally opposed to an accession 
changed their position. Moreover, so far all popular initiatives in Slovakia 
were launched by opposition parties, which due to their minority status 
were not able to pass a resolution in the National Council for the calling of 
a referendum according to article 95 par. 1 CS. This substantiates the 
popular initiative’s main usage as means for the minority parties to trigger 
a popular vote against the will of the governing majority. 
25 'Ein polarisiertes Land sucht seinen Präsidenten', Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) 
article from 21.3.2009, online on: http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/startseite/ein-
polarisiertes-land-sucht-seinen-praesidenten-1.2233855 (last accessed on 
06.09.2012). 
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As mentioned before, the subject matters of the initiative proposals were 
politically  controversial  and  aimed  at  profiling  the  own  party  at  the 
expense  of  the  opposing  parties.  That  explains  why  the  campaigns 
preceding  the  referendums  were  dominated  by  political  struggles, 
especially  between  members  of  the  governing  coalition  and  the 
opposition. 
Furthermore, the Constitution  empowers the president to  influence the 
outcome of a referendum by choosing the voting date. As to article 95 and 
96 par. 2 CS, he is only obliged to schedule it within 120 days after the 
receipt of the initiative or the resolution, and according to article 98 par. 1 
CS, not less than ninety days before parliamentary elections. Article 98 
par. 2 CS is relevant, as it allows the president to schedule a referendum 
on the same date as the parliamentary elections. Although this has not 
been  confirmed  by  the  referendum  outcomes  so  far,  the  political 
experiences have proven that the president may be tempted to schedule a 
ballot  according  to  his  or  her  own  political  preferences.  Thus,  the 
president could schedule a referendum, of which he or she is in favor, so 
that it would take place on the same day as the general elections, with the 
hope of thereby increasing the turnout and ensuring the validity of the 
proposal. Or conversely,  the president can abstain from scheduling the 
vote  together  with  the  election,  if  he  or  she  opposes  a  referendum 
proposal and hopes to decrease its chances of achieving a sufficient voter 
turnout. 
3.3 People’s  personal  attitude  towards  participation  in  the  decision-
making
The experiences with the Slovak referendums held so far prove a lack of 
motivation on the part of the Slovak people to participate in the decision-
making in matters of state. The institutional inconsistencies related to the 
constitution and the political landscape of Slovakia play an important role 
in this. 
From the perspective of the voters, the abstention can be reasoned firstly 
by the discontent of the people with their representatives and the political 
elite.  The  deep  political  polarization  and  populism  imply  that  the 
referendum procedures follow a general pattern, namely that the ballot 
question,  the campaigns,  the legal status  and the results  have always 
been issues of heavy political debates, which put Slovakia’s political and 
economic  stability  into  question  (Láštic,  2007:189).  Furthermore,  this 
raised the people’s disbelief in the value of direct democracy as means of 
participation in the decision-making of the state. So far the voters have 
been  consulted  merely  on  issues  which  were  of  value  to  the  political 
parties, for these to strengthen their political profile in order to achieve 
voter support and election success. On the other hand, the probably most 
important decision in Slovakia’s history, namely on its independence, was 
12
C2D Working Paper Series 41/2012
decided  without  involving  the  electorate  and  by  circumvention  of  the 
constitutional  provisions  (Bárány/Brhlíková/Colotka,  2001:177seq.). 
Moreover, the referendum of 1997 showed that it is in the hands of the 
rulers to manipulate the referendum processes and to control the impacts 
of their outcomes, without being held accountable in any way. Thus, the 
referendum apathy of the Slovak people can be explained with the general 
opinion emerging from the experiences made with regard to the popular 
initiatives, as well as the fact that referendums have been an instrument 
of political parties seeking public attention and voter support, rather than 
a means to enable governance by the people according to the principles of 
democracy.
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